# With Hindsight, Can We See the Financial/Liquidity Crisis Coming?

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#### Introduction

# Looking Back, Do Risk Premiums Hint at a Pending Crisis?

- The ongoing global financial crisis has raised new questions about the contributions of financial market frictions to business cycle fluctuation and risk in financial markets.
- What economic forces underlie variation in excess returns in bond markets over the past twenty years?
  - (i) Comove with business cycle variables?
  - (ii) Comove with financial conditions, liquidity, and hedging activity?

- Business Cycle Components of Bond Risk Premiums: See Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2010)

## Business Cycle Components of Bond Risk Premiums

- The literature on risk premiums has focused on indigenous risks in bond markets: "level," "slope," and "curvature" as captured by the principal components (PCs) of bond yields.
  - See Duffee [2002], Dai and Singleton [2002], Cochrane and Piazzesi [2005].
- Yield curves factors reflect all economic sources of riskgrowth, inflation, liquidity, financial frictions.

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- Yield curves factors reflect all economic sources of riskgrowth, inflation, liquidity, financial frictions.
- How much variation do business cycle factors explain?
  - Ludvigson and Ng [2009] and Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton [2010]: risk premiums determined by economic growth.

- Business Cycle Components of Bond Risk Premiums: See Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2010)

## Realized Excess Return on a Slope-Tracking Portfolio



-Business Cycle Components of Bond Risk Premiums: See Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2010)

# A Dynamic Term Structure Model in Which the Business Cycle Influences Risk Premiums

- Expected excess returns in swap markets influenced by output growth and inflation.
- All other risks captured through yield-curve factors (level, slope, curvature).
- Do business cycle factors alone explain risk premiums?
- Look through the lens of forward term premiums:

$$FTP_t^{9,1} \equiv f_t^{9,1} - E_t[r_{t+9yr}^{1yr}]$$

Business Cycle Components of Bond Risk Premiums: See Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2010)

### Standarized "in-9-for-1" Forward Term Premium



- Financial Frictions and Bond Market Risk Premiums: Joslin and Singleton (2010)

## Do Financial Frictions Matter for Swap Spreads?

- ▶ What should we look for? [Remember, we have hindsight!]
- 1. Liquidity and the balance sheets of financial institutions: Shin [2008], Adrian and Shin [2009].
- 2. Funding and Hedging pressures from GSEs: slope of the term structure of GSE spreads, GSE2.
  - ► Massive growth in balance sheets of *GSE*s, indicative of funding conditions.
  - GSEs hedge the interest rate risk of their mortgage positions with swaps.
- 3. Conditions in bank-loan market: senior loan officer survey of demand for C&I loans by large and medium size companies.

- Financial Frictions and Bond Market Risk Premiums: Joslin and Singleton (2010)

#### Repo Positions and Mean Leverage of Primary Dealers



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In Hindsight, Can We See The Crisis?

- Financial Frictions and Bond Market Risk Premiums: Joslin and Singleton (2010)

#### Banks and Their Shadow



Note: Shadow banks are ABS issuers, finance companies, and funding corporation Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

From Shin (2009)

- Financial Frictions and Bond Market Risk Premiums: Joslin and Singleton (2010)

#### How Was this Growth Funded?



- Financial Frictions and Bond Market Risk Premiums: Joslin and Singleton (2010)

## Senior Loan Officer Survey And BBB Corporate Spreads



-Financial Frictions and Bond Market Risk Premiums: Joslin and Singleton (2010)

#### Slope of GSE Spread Curve



Financial Frictions and Bond Market Risk Premiums: Joslin and Singleton (2010)

## Projections of $xrLevel_{t+1yr}$ and $xrSlope_{t+1yr}$

$\sim$	LHS	$xrLevel_{t+1yr}$			$xrSlope_{t+1yr}$					
RHS										
PC1		$424^{*}$			.306*					
PC2		$.853^{\dagger}$			377*					
PC3		-1.90			1.11*					
INF		-4.58	2.60	.148	2.33	-2.21	470			
GIP		$1.83^{*}$	$2.13^{*}$	$2.91^{\diamond}$	935*	$-1.17^{\dagger}$	$-1.65^{\diamond}$			
GPay		$-9.79^{\circ}$	$-10.2^{\diamond}$	$-10.0^{\diamond}$	$1.36^{*}$	-1.88	1.10			
MbsED		.001		$.016^{\diamond}$	005*		$013^{\diamond}$			
GSE2		$0004^{\diamond}$		$0003^{\diamond}$	0001		$0001^{\diamond}$			
C&ILT		.004		$.039^{\diamond}$	.026*		0005			
ShwBnk		-1.83		$-2.22^{\dagger}$	408		406			
$R^2$		0.75	0.47	0.69	0.91	0.52	0.86			
<b>Significance:</b> $107 + 507 + 1007$										

Significance:  $\diamond 1\%$ ; \* 5%; † 10%.

Financial Frictions and Bond Market Risk Premiums: Joslin and Singleton (2010)

## Projections of $xrLevel_{t+6m}$ and $xrSlope_{t+6m}$

	LHS	$xrLevel_{t+6m}$			$xrSlope_{t+6m}$					
RHS										
PC1		136			.058					
PC2		.147			.174*					
PC3		$-2.15^{*}$			.781*					
INF		1.57	$3.77^{\diamond}$	1.65	256	788	.375			
GIP		$1.73^{\diamond}$	$1.83^{\circ}$	$2.00^{\diamond}$	$-1.24^{\diamond}$	$-1.01^{\diamond}$	$-1.27^{\diamond}$			
GPay		$-7.19^{\circ}$	$-7.07^{\diamond}$	$-7.29^{\diamond}$	$1.38^{*}$	047	$1.10^{+}$			
MbsED		006		$.005^{\diamond}$	$005^{\diamond}$		$007^{\diamond}$			
GSE2		0001		0007	0005		$0001^{\diamond}$			
C&ILT		.012		$.023^{\dagger}$	.0001		005			
ShwBnk		$-3.18^{\diamond}$		$-3.09^{\diamond}$	.664		.268			
$R^2$		0.50	0.40	0.48	0.78	0.71	0.76			
Significance: $\wedge 1\%$ , $\pm 5\%$ , $\pm 10\%$										

Significance:  $\diamond 1\%$ ; \* 5%;  $\dagger 10\%$ .

- Financial Frictions and Bond Market Risk Premiums: Joslin and Singleton (2010)

## And the Next Crisis?

- Will it be
  - GSEs or the Mortgage Market?
  - Shadow Banks?
- What should we be measuring?
- Are our regulators collecting the requisite data to see the next crisis coming?

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