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Related Issuers
Amarillo National Bank
American Express National Bank
Associated Bank, N.A.
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico
Banco Santander Puerto Rico
Bank of Hawaii
Bank of the West
BankUnited, National Association
BMO Harris Bank National Association
BMW Bank of North America
BOKF, NA
Branch Banking and Trust Company
Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.
Capital One, N.A.
CIBC Bank USA
CIT Bank, N.A.
Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania
Citizens Bank, N.A.
City National Bank
Comerica Bank
Commerce Bank
Compass Bank
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Delaware
Discover Bank
E*TRADE Bank
Fifth Third Bank, Ohio
First Hawaiian Bank
First Midwest Bank
First National Bank of Omaha
First National Bank of Pennsylvania
First Republic Bank
First Tennessee Bank, National Association
FirstBank Puerto Rico
First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company
Frost Bank
FULTON BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
Hancock Whitney Bank
HSBC Bank USA, N.A.
Huntington National Bank
INTRUST Bank, N.A.
KeyBank National Association
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company
MB Financial Bank, N.A.
MUFG Union Bank, N.A.
New York Community Bank
Northern Trust Company
Old National Bank
People's United Bank, N.A.
PNC Bank, N.A.
Regions Bank
Sallie Mae Bank
Santander Bank, N.A.
Silicon Valley Bank
SunTrust Bank
Synovus Bank
TCF National Bank
TD Bank, N.A.
Texas Capital Bank, National Association
U.S. Bank National Association
United Bank
Webster Bank N.A.
Wilmington Trust, National Association
Zions Bancorporation, National Association
Rating Action:

Moody's assigns Counterparty Risk Ratings to bank subsidiaries of 60 US banking groups

20 Jun 2018

Ratings are assigned following 6 June 2018 update to Moody's Banks rating methodology

New York, June 20, 2018 -- Moody's Investors Service has today assigned local currency and foreign currency Counterparty Risk Ratings to the rated bank subsidiaries of 60 US banking groups.

Moody's Counterparty Risk Ratings (CRRs) are opinions of the ability of entities to honor the uncollateralized portion of non-debt counterparty financial liabilities (CRR liabilities) and also reflect the expected financial losses in the event such liabilities are not honored. CRR liabilities typically relate to transactions with unrelated parties. Examples of CRR liabilities include the uncollateralized portion of payables arising from derivatives transactions and the uncollateralized portion of liabilities under sale and repurchase agreements. CRRs are not applicable to funding commitments or other obligations associated with covered bonds, letters of credit, guarantees, servicer and trustee obligations, and other similar obligations that arise from a bank performing its essential operating functions.

The following ratings were assigned:

Issuer: Amarillo National Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: American Express National Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: Associated Bank, N.A.

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: BMO Harris Bank National Association

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: BMW Bank of North America

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: BOKF, NA

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: Banco Popular de Puerto Rico

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of B1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of NP

Issuer: Banco Santander Puerto Rico

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: BankUnited, National Association

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-3

Issuer: Bank of Hawaii

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: Bank of the West

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: Branch Banking and Trust Company

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: CIBC Bank USA

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: CIT Bank, N.A.

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Ba1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of NP

Issuer: Capital One, N.A.

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: City National Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: Citizens Bank, N.A.

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: Comerica Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: Commerce Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: Compass Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

..Issuer: Deutsche Bank National Trust Company

.... Long-term Local and Foreign Currency Counterparty Risk Rating, Assigned Baa1

.... Short-term Local and Foreign Currency Counterparty Risk Rating, Assigned P-2

..Issuer: Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas

.... Long-term Local and Foreign Currency Counterparty Risk Rating, Assigned Baa1

.... Short-term Local and Foreign Currency Counterparty Risk Rating, Assigned P-2

..Issuer: Deutsche Bank Trust Company Delaware

.... Long-term Local and Foreign Currency Counterparty Risk Rating, Assigned Baa1

.... Short-term Local and Foreign Currency Counterparty Risk Rating, Assigned P-2

Issuer: Discover Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-3

Issuer: E*TRADE Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: Fifth Third Bank, Ohio

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: FirstBank Puerto Rico

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of B3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of NP

Issuer: First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: First Hawaiian Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: First Midwest Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: First National Bank of Omaha

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: First National Bank of Pennsylvania

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: First Republic Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: First Tennessee Bank, National Association

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: Frost Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: Fulton Bank, National Association

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: HSBC Bank USA, N.A.

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Aa3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: Hancock Whitney Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: Huntington National Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: INTRUST Bank, N.A.

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: KeyBank National Association

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: MB Financial Bank, N.A.

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa3, on review for upgrade

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-3, on review for upgrade

Issuer: MUFG Union Bank, N.A.

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: New York Community Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: Northern Trust Company

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: Old National Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: People's United Bank, N.A.

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: PNC Bank, N.A.

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: Regions Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: Sallie Mae Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Ba1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of NP

Issuer: Santander Bank, N.A.

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: Silicon Valley Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: SunTrust Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: Synovus Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-3

Issuer: TCF National Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: TD Bank, N.A.

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A1

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: Texas Capital Bank, National Association

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: U.S. Bank National Association

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Aa3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: United Bank

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: Webster Bank N.A.

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

Issuer: Wilmington Trust, National Association

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-1

Issuer: ZB, N.A.

.... Local currency and foreign currency Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa2

.... Local currency and foreign currency Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of P-2

The following ratings were upgraded:

Issuer: HSBC Bank USA, N.A.

.... Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to Aa3(cr)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's expects the banks subject to this rating action will be resolved through an Operational Resolution Regime (ORR) in the event of failure, but are likely to be wound-down and liquidated through FDIC receivership and Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act rather than being resolved as going-concerns under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.

In Moody's view, secured counterparties to banks typically benefit from greater protections under insolvency laws and bank resolution regimes than do senior unsecured creditors, and that this benefit is likely to extend to the unsecured portion of such secured transactions in most bank resolution regimes. Moody's believes that in many cases regulators will use their discretion to allow a bank in resolution to continue to honor its CRR liabilities or to transfer those liabilities to another party who will honor them. However in the US, the FDIC has a narrower mandate of effecting a resolution at the lowest cost. As such, Moody's believes that the FDIC, in fulfilling this mandate, will consider the extent to which honoring the failed bank's operating obligations supports the value of the franchise in receivership (and the amount a potential acquirer is willing to pay), thus reducing the cost to the FDIC and increasing the loss severity on CRR obligations.

Therefore, the CRRs for rated bank subsidiaries of 59 of the US banking groups covered in this action are equal to each bank's adjusted baseline credit assessment (BCA) and one notch below the level of each bank's counterparty risk assessment (CRA). This reflects Moody's general expectation that CRR liabilities face high loss severity in default, because Moody's expects the volume of this tranche of liabilities for such banks to be very small as failure or default approaches and the amount of more junior ranking liabilities would also be more limited.

Moody's has also upgraded the Counterparty Risk Assessment (CRA) for HSBC Bank USA, N.A. to Aa3(cr) from A1(cr). While Moody's expects HBSC Bank USA will be subject to full FDIC receivership similar to the other US banks covered by this action, the rating agency noted that HSBC Bank USA has a more significant volume of counterparty exposures and a more significant amount of debt outstanding at the bank and its immediate parent holding company than is the case at the other US banks covered by this action. The rating agency believes those considerations, together with the bank's importance to the operations of the global HSBC group, increases the likelihood that the US FDIC will not pursue an outright liquidation of the bank but will instead, in cooperation with foreign resolution authorities, seek to sustain in resolution for a period of time those operations of the bank which are most important for the preservation of the group as a going concern.

Moody's believes such a strategy would still be consistent with the FDIC's mandate to pursue a least cost resolution under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act since a more rapid wind-down and the imposition of losses on client counterparties would cause a more severe erosion of enterprise value at the bank as well as at the group as a whole. At Aa3(cr) the bank's CRA is two notches above its adjusted BCA, reflecting a lower probability of default for the bank's operational liabilities based on the expected resolution strategy as well as the significant amount of debt outstanding that is junior to the bank's CRR obligations.

The Aa3 CRR assigned to HSBC Bank USA N.A. is in line with the bank's CRA of Aa3(cr) and is two notches above the bank's a2 adjusted BCA. The rating agency believes the significant amount of debt outstanding provides greater loss protection for the bank's CRR obligations which should lower the severity of loss on such obligations relative to the other banks covered by this action. As a result, the assigned CRR is in line with the bank's CRA rather than being one notch below the CRA.

Rating pressure on the CRRs for the rated bank subsidiaries of all of the US banking groups covered by this action will come from rating pressure on the banks' BCAs.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down

Amarillo National Bank

Upward rating pressure would emerge if the bank improved its geographical diversification without increasing its risk profile, which Moody's see as unlikely. Downward movement in the BCA could emerge if Moody's believe the bank's underwriting standards are weakening, possibly evidenced by above-average loan growth. An extended period of lower oil prices beyond Moody's expectations could also be credit negative, particularly if credit costs in the energy or non-energy portfolio are expected to be significant.

American Express National Bank

Moody's does not see upward rating movement on the standalone BCA from the current level given the company's funding structure and potential exposure to changes in interchange rates from competitive and/or regulatory initiatives. Downward pressure on the standalone BCA would occur if there was significant erosion in the firm's liquidity position, material decline in profitability such that return on average assets dropped below 3.0% or material deterioration in Amex's credit performance or capital levels.

Associated Bank, N.A.

For upward rating pressure to emerge, Associated would need to show material improvement in its capital ratios as well as sustained improvement in core profitability. Downward movement in the BCA could occur if there is a decline in asset quality or capitalization.

BMO Harris Bank National Association

Upward rating pressure would emerge if BMO's U.S. profitability and efficiency profile materially improve. Downward movement in the BCA could emerge if the bank's asset quality deteriorates.

BMW Bank of North America

BMW Bank could be upgraded if its ultimate parent BMW AG is upgraded, provided the bank maintains a solid financial profile and parental support remains intact. The most likely source of positive pressure on BMW Bank's BCA would be a strengthened liquidity profile. A downgrade of ultimate parent BMW AG or deterioration of parental support would result in a downgrade of BMW Bank's ratings. Deterioration in asset quality beyond expectations and sustained weakening in profitability, liquidity and capital adequacy in relation to peers could result in negative pressure on the bank's BCA.

BOKF, NA

Upward movement in the bank's BCA would depend on substantial and sustained improvement in profitability, capital, or asset quality. A meaningful reduction in the bank's energy concentration would also be credit positive because the energy sector has proven to be somewhat volatile. Downward movement in the BCA could emerge if the bank reduced its capital position and increased its market funding reliance.

Banco Popular de Puerto Rico

The destruction from Hurricane Maria eliminates the likelihood of upward movement in Popular's standalone BCA in the near term. In the long term, it could be upgraded if Moody's observes sustained improvement in the bank's problem loan levels and profitability, and the bank maintains strong capitalization and liquidity. Popular's standalone BCA could be downgraded if Moody's believes that the recovery after Hurricane Maria will not materialize as anticipated.

Banco Santander Puerto Rico

BSPR's standalone BCA could be upgraded if Moody's observes sustained improvement in the bank's problem loan levels and profitability, coupled with maintenance of strong capital and liquidity. BSPR's standalone BCA could be downgraded if Moody's believes there will be a sharp increase in problem loans as a consequence of Puerto Rico's economic or fiscal challenges. Any deterioration in funding could also create negative rating pressure.

BankUnited, National Association

Upward rating movement in the standalone BCA could emerge as BankUnited's loan portfolio matures and its growth rate continues to moderate. Sustained improvement in its core funding profile would also be positive. A significant weakening of BankUnited's asset quality profile would result in negative rating pressure.

Bank of Hawaii

Given the negative outlook, there is limited upward rating pressure at this time. To return the outlook to stable, BOH's risk weighted capital and liquidity metrics would need to stabilize. A continuation of the declining trend in BOH's risk weighted capital metrics and/or liquid resources would lead to downward rating pressure. Downward movement in the BCA could also result from expansion initiatives which do not complement BOH's island-based regional banking franchise and which could in turn result in a worsening of asset quality.

Bank of the West

Upward rating pressure at BW is constrained by its ownership by BNPP, which has a standalone BCA that is currently two notches lower. BW would also need to achieve higher levels of profitability and core deposit funding relative to a2 peers to be considered for an upgrade. Absent the influence of rating movement at BNPP, the most likely source of negative pressure on the ratings of BW would be a reversal of recent positive trends in asset quality or profitability.

Branch Banking and Trust Company Positive rating movement on BB&T's BCA is not likely given how highly it is rated. For upward rating pressure to emerge, BB&T's capital metrics and profitability would have to improve substantially without a related increase in its risk appetite. Downward rating pressure on BB&T's BCA would emerge if Moody's sensed any erosion in its risk discipline, if its capital position declined or if it became more aggressive in the pursuit of acquisitions, or if its profitability fell below an ROAA of 1.0%.

CIBC Bank USA

Factors that could lead to an upgrade with respect to CIBC Bank USA's standalone BCA include a funding base that was more reliant on core retail deposits would be viewed favorably, as would more robust capital. Moderated loan growth and reduced concentration risk could also generate positive rating pressure. Factors that could lead to a downgrade with respect to CIBC Bank USA's standalone BCA include more aggressive loan growth that increased concentration risk, or more reliance on wholesale funding.

CIT Bank, N.A.

Moody's could upgrade CIT's ratings if: 1) net profitability stabilizes based on a decrease in business transition related expenses, effective management of credit and cyclical business challenges, and achieving targeted reductions in operating costs; 2) the stability and quality of deposits continues to positively evolve; and 3) if capital strength remains adequate given the composition of business risks. Moody's could downgrade CIT's ratings if the bank's net finance margin weakens materially, asset quality declines materially, and consolidated capital position declines to less than 10% TCE/RWA.

Capital One, N.A. and Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.

Given the increase in charge-offs and reduced profitability over the last several years, an upgrade in Capital One's BCA is unlikely. Capital One's BCA and ratings could move down in response to aggressive underwriting, rising charge-offs, and an inability to generate above average profitability given the risk profile of its loan portfolio. Weakening capital ratios could also lead to negative rating pressure.

Citizens Bank, N.A. and Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania

Sustained improvement in capital, profitability and risk profile would be necessary to create positive rating pressure. The standalone BCA could be downgraded if efforts to improve profitability change Citizens' risk profile, such as aggressive loan growth with weakening of underwriting, or if Citizens' strong liquidity profile weakened.

City National Bank

Upward pressure to the standalone BCA could result if City National meaningfully improved its profitability metrics while maintaining its strong asset quality record through the cycle. Downward pressure to the standalone BCA could occur if City National's strategic actions as part of RBC were inconsistent with its historically conservative business risk profile.

Comerica Bank

Upward pressure would emerge if the bank demonstrated a sustained improvement in capital and a more resilient earnings profile while maintaining its asset quality and liquidity profile. Downward rating pressure would emerge if Moody's views a negative change in posture towards capital management, credit appetite or liquidity.

Commerce Bank

Upward rating pressure could occur with stronger capitalization and profitability. Downward pressure on Commerce's BCA could occur if rapid expansion of its loan portfolio increases the bank's risk profile, or if its capital weakens significantly.

Compass Bank

Upward rating pressure would emerge if BBVA Compass' demonstrates conservative underwriting through modest loan growth and good asset quality performance as well as improved profitability and reduced brokered deposits. Downward rating pressure would emerge if the bank embarked on a growth strategy that materially leveraged BBVA Compass' balance sheet adding asset risk and decreasing capital metrics and liquid resources.

Discover Bank

Diversification through prudent, measured growth of non-card asset classes and continued growth of deposit would put upward rating pressure. Downward rating pressure would emerge if Moody's expect a material weakening of key liquidity, capital metrics and/or underwriting standards.

Deutsche Bank Trust Corporation (DBTC)

The negative issuer outlooks on DBTC and those of its three rated trust company subsidiaries referenced above indicate that there is no imminent upward pressure on the ratings. Downward pressure could develop on DBTC and its subsidiaries if their own solvency or liquidity profiles were to deteriorate or if its parent, Deutsche Bank AG, is downgraded.

E*TRADE Bank

Upward rating pressure could emerge from the development of profitable new revenue streams to complement E*TRADE's existing transaction and spread-based activities, diversifying cash generating capabilities without adding significant credit risk, improved earnings generation derived from strong organic growth, and disciplined cost management. Downward rating pressure could emerge from a shift in strategy to tolerate a significant increase in debt leverage driven by debt-funded shareholder distributions or M&A activity, especially if debt/EBITDA worsened to about 2.0x, and absent a clear and cohesive plan to return leverage to its preexisting level in the near-term. Increased tolerance for asset risk at E*TRADE Bank could also result in a downgrade because it could lead to greater risk of unexpected losses and capital depletion. Downward rating pressure could also result from a significant deterioration in franchise value, via a security breach of client accounts, a sustained service outage, or a significant legal or compliance issue resulting in reputational damage, loss of customers, and litigation costs pressuring profit margins.

Fifth Third Bank, Ohio

Fifth Third's standalone BCA could move up if it raised its capital ratios. Meaningful deterioration in capitalization or asset quality could result in negative rating pressure.

FirstBank Puerto Rico

The destruction from Hurricane Maria eliminates the likelihood of upward movement in FirstBank's standalone BCA in the near term. In the long term, it could be upgraded if Moody's observes sustained improvement in the bank's problem loan levels and profitability, the bank maintains strong capitalization and liquidity and/or Puerto Rico's economic outlook stabilizes or improves. FirstBank's standalone BCA could be downgraded if Moody's believes that the recovery after Hurricane Maria does not materialize as anticipated.

First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company

Upward rating pressure would emerge from sustainable material improvement in First Citizens' core profitability, without a corresponding increase in its risk profile. An aggressive asset risk posture evidenced by above-average organic loan growth or weakened underwriting standards, combined with a deterioration in First Citizens' capital ratios, could result in negative rating pressure.

First Hawaiian Bank

If FHB eventually becomes an independent company and is no longer a BNPP subsidiary that shares ownership with BW, FHB could be upgraded provided it maintains its strong financial metrics and low risk profile. Ownership by an entity with a higher standalone BCA could also lead to an upgrade. If FHB was acquired by a lower rated entity, FHB's ratings could be downgraded. Any change in strategy or financial management which could increase the risk profile of FHB would also be negative.

First Midwest Bank

An upgrade of the BCA could occur if First Midwest improves its capital ratios and reduces its CRE concentrations. Downward pressure on the BCA could emerge if Moody's believes that First Midwest loan growth either organically or through acquisitions, weakens its credit profile.

First National Bank of Omaha

For upward movement on First National's standalone baseline credit assessment to emerge, a more diversified business mix and earnings stream are required. Downward movement on First National's standalone bank-level baseline credit assessment would result if Moody's believes that the bank's asset risk or capital ratios will materially weaken.

First National Bank of Pennsylvania

FNB's ratings could be upgraded if Moody's views a more predictable acquisition strategy and continued good asset quality. Sustained improvement in capital and liquidity metrics would also create upward rating pressure. A materially lower capital position or weakening in asset quality in either FNB's originated or acquired loan portfolios could result in downward rating movement.

First Republic Bank

If First Republic's loan growth slows, upward rating pressure could emerge provided its other financial metrics are maintained and core deposit funding growth provides a greater cushion in excess of its loans. Signals that suggests First Republic has loosened its underwriting standards or expansion into new lending products or geographies could cause a negative rating action. Weakening core deposit funding of its loans could be another source of downward rating pressure.

First Tennessee Bank, National Association

Positive rating pressure could emerge from a sustained improvement in First Horizon's capital ratios while maintaining good asset quality performance. Negative rating pressure could emerge from further weakening in First Horizon's capital metrics and/or a deterioration in asset quality in either First Horizon's originated portfolio or acquired portfolio.

Frost Bank

Upward rating pressure would emerge if Cullen/Frost improved its geographical diversification without increasing its risk profile. A meaningful reduction in the bank's energy concentration would also be credit positive because the energy sector has proven to be somewhat volatile. Downward movement in the BCA could emerge if Moody's views a change in credit appetite, possibly evidenced by above-average loan growth.

Fulton Bank, National Association

Fulton would need to reduce its CRE concentration further and strengthen its capital to create upward pressure on its standalone BCA. Moody's does not expect these changes to occur in the medium-term. The most likely source of downward pressure on its standalone BCA would be an aggressive capital management posture that would compromise the bank's current capital position. Moody's expectation of significant deterioration in asset quality would also create downward pressure.

HSBC Bank USA, N.A.

HSBC USA's BCA and ratings could be upgraded if the company were to significantly improve its profitability without compromising its good asset quality, capital or liquidity metrics. However, Moody's does not expect significant improvement in the next two years. HSBC USA's ratings could be downgraded for any of the following reasons: 1) a lowering of the BCA of HSBC Holdings plc, 2) a reduction in our expectation of parental support from HSBC Holdings for HSBC USA; and/or 3) a downgrade of HSBC USA's BCA. The biggest risk to the BCA is the failure to address past regulatory issues, as well as the emergence of any new internal control issues. Downward BCA pressure could also arise from lack of sustainable improvement in profitability or a deterioration in commercial loan credit quality as a result of the rapid loan growth in prior years.

Hancock Whitney Bank

Upward pressure would emerge if capital ratios improved and/or the bank reduced its energy exposure, particularly to the relatively riskier oilfield service sector. Downward movement in the BCA could emerge if Moody's views a negative change in the bank's posture towards capital management or credit appetite.

Huntington National Bank

A prerequisite for a higher rating is materially stronger capital ratios. Downward pressure on the BCA could emerge if Moody's believes that Huntington's above-average loan growth in certain portfolios, such as auto loans, is characterized by weaker underwriting, thereby making asset quality more susceptible to deterioration.

INTRUST Bank, N.A.

Upward movement in the standalone BCA could occur if its capital ratios markedly improved, which Moody's views as unlikely to occur in the medium term. Downward movement in the standalone BCA could occur if capital declined. A downgrade could also occur if Moody's views that INTRUST's risk appetite has increased, for example because of above average loan growth or a further noticeable increase in its CRE concentration.

KeyBank National Association

Upward movement of Key's BCA would hinge on higher tangible capital ratios and sustained improvement in profitability. Downward pressure on the BCA could emerge if Key's capital or asset quality deteriorates significantly.

MB Financial Bank, N.A.

MB Financial's ratings could be upgraded to the same level as Fifth Third upon closing of the transaction assuming that it would be absorbed into Fifth Third. Slower loan growth from current double-digit levels and/or higher capital ratios. A termination of the planned transaction, with no material change to MB Financial's current financial profile would most likely result in an affirmation of MB Financial's current ratings with a stable outlook. Meaningful deterioration in capitalization or asset quality could result in negative rating pressure.

MUFG Union Bank, N.A.

An increase in MUAH's profitability would drive upward pressure on the standalone BCA. Moody's believes that improvements in non-interest income and a more efficient operating profile are necessary for MUAH to achieve meaningfully higher profitability. A reduction of wholesale funding would also be positive. MUAH is likely to be a platform for its parent company to expand in the US. Downward movement of the standalone BCA could occur if MUAH's growth initiatives were perceived as aggressive with potential to increase its risk profile. Signals of this would be a large acquisition, above-average organic growth, and/or increased leverage. A weakening of MUAH's underwriting discipline would also be negative given that this is a key support to the current above-average BCA. Upward or downward changes in the adjusted BCA could result from changes in Moody's assumption of parental support or change in the credit profile of MUFG or MUFG Bank, Ltd.

Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company and Wilmington Trust, National Association

M&T's standalone BCA could move up if it reduced its large CRE concentration or increased its capital ratios. A downward movement to M&T's standalone BCA could develop if its capital ratios declined significantly or Moody's perceives that M&T's asset quality performance will weaken relative to same-rated peers. A sustained increase in market funding or decline in liquid assets would also be negative.

New York Community Bank

For NYCB's standalone BCA to get upgraded, it would need to 1) successfully diversify so as to reduce its commercial real estate exposure without significantly increasing its asset risk and 2) improve its core funding to levels comparable with peers. Future downward rating pressure on NYCB's standalone BCA would emerge if there are signals that NYCB's underwriting standards are slipping, either because of looser internal practices or in response to a more competitive market. Rapid growth, whether through acquisition or organic, would also be negative, particularly if it weakens the bank's capital position.

Northern Trust Company

Given Northern Trust's comparatively high positioning on our rating scale, upward movement on its BCA would require significantly stronger profitability and capital in the current environment, without an increase in its risk profile. Downward movement on Northern Trust's BCA is not likely absent material erosion of its core franchise, or from sizable deterioration in its credit quality, which Moody's does not anticipate.

Old National Bank

Given the negative outlook, there is limited upward rating pressure on Old National's standalone BCA until it improves its capital ratios and its liquidity metrics. Downward movement of the BCA could occur if the bank's capital or liquidity fails to return to prior levels or maintain a positive trend. Additional sizeable acquisitions would also be negative.

PNC Bank, N.A.

Upward movement on PNC's standalone BCA will not materialize absent a significant increase in earnings and/or capital, all without an increase in its risk profile. Downward pressure on PNC's standalone BCA is likely if Moody's believes its asset quality will deteriorate noticeably or if its profitability suffers a material downturn.

People's United Bank, N.A.

An improvement in People's capital levels, and a reduction in its CRE concentration, would add positive rating pressure. Significant deterioration in asset quality, pressuring profitability and capital, would add negative rating pressure.

Regions Bank

Improvements in asset quality and profitability could lead to higher ratings, provided a conservative risk profile is maintained. Higher capital ratios would also support a higher rating. Signs of weakening in underwriting discipline or rebuilding of asset concentrations, such as commercial real estate, could lead to negative rating actions.

Sallie Mae Bank

SLM's ratings could be upgraded if its funding and liquidity profile strengthens as a result of slower balance sheet growth and a stronger deposit franchise such as by reducing its reliance on brokered deposits, while maintaining solid and stable financial performance. In addition, successfully accessing the unsecured debt market, continued stability in accessing the securitization market, along with diversifying into non-student loan asset classes would be viewed positively. SLM's ratings could be downgraded if its financial performance or asset quality materially deteriorates. Negative ratings pressure would also result from potential regulatory actions in the student lending sector.

Santander Bank, N.A.

SHUSA's successful remediation of its current regulatory deficiencies and a sustained period without further process or control issues would be positive. A significant deterioration in Santander Bank's capital ratios, which are currently a key credit strength, could lead to downward movement on the bank's BCA and deposit and debt ratings. A downgrade of the ultimate parent's BCA could also lead to a downgrade of Santander Bank's adjusted BCA and debt and deposit ratings. The holding company's debt ratings could be downgraded if 1) growth at Santander Consumer dilutes SHUSA's overall credit profile by becoming a much larger contributor of assets or earnings, and/or 2) Santander Consumer's credit profile deteriorates, restricting the finance company's access to funding/liquidity.

Silicon Valley Bank

Meaningfully slower loan growth and reduced sector and borrower concentrations could lead to upward pressure on the standalone BCA provided other financial metrics were maintained. Downward rating pressure would emerge if SVB's liquidity profile weakened by either a higher reliance on market funding or noticeable reduction it its holdings of liquid assets. Downward rating pressure would also emerge if Moody's believed SVB's underwriting standard weakened.

SunTrust Bank

For upward movement on SunTrust's standalone BCA to emerge, it will need to improve its comparatively low capital ratios, which management has not signaled any intent to do. Downward movement on SunTrust's standalone BCA would result from a significant downturn in asset quality or from a material reversal of recent profitability gains, both of which Moody's sees as unlikely.

Synovus Bank

A reduction of the CRE concentration could lead to an upgrade provided that growth in other lending areas is conservatively underwritten. Synovus also needs to sustain its asset quality, capital and profitability metrics. A downgrade could occur if Moody's believes Synovus' loan growth is liable to reverse the improvement in asset quality metrics or if its commercial real estate concentration increases significantly. Deterioration in core deposit funding of the loan portfolio would also be negative.

TCF National Bank

TCF's standalone BCA could move up if the high growth in its national lending portfolios subsides, its asset quality improves further, or if its capital increases. A greater proportion of liquid assets would also be positive. Downward movement on the standalone BCA could result from deterioration in TCF's asset quality beyond our expectations, particularly in its national lending portfolios, given their rapid growth or a decrease in its capital ratios.

TD Bank, N.A.

There is little little upward pressure on its standalone BCA absent a combination of much more robust profitability and continued strong credit quality through the next cycle. Any future downward movement on TD US standalone bank-level BCA would be based on significant weakening of its financial fundamentals from their current levels. Heightened risk appetite at TD Securities (USA) would also increase negative rating pressure at the TD GUS level. A lower rating at parent Toronto-Dominion would also have negative implications for TD US debt and deposit ratings.

Texas Capital Bank, National Association

Upward pressure would emerge if capital ratios improved significantly and growth aspirations lowered, which Moody's does not expect in the medium-term. Downward movement in the BCA could emerge if there was evidence of a relaxation in controls over the bank's commercial real estate and/or national lending businesses.

U.S. Bank National Association

Given USB's high position on Moody's ratings scale, upward pressure on the BCA is unlikely. This would require sustained and significantly better performance relative to peers on capital ratios, asset quality metrics and profitability over the long term. Downward pressure on the BCA would materialize if Moody's perceives a weakening in USB's risk profile, for example, an increase in concentration risk or evidence of another control failure. A sustained weakening in capital, asset quality, or profitability metrics would also be negative.

United Bank

An upgrade of the banks' Baseline Credit Assessments (BCA) could occur if United reduces its CRE concentration and/or raises its capital ratios. Downward pressure on the BCA could emerge if Moody's believes United's asset quality would deteriorate noticeably.

Webster Bank N.A.

Upward pressure could emerge if the bank demonstrated a sustained improvement in capital and an above-average asset quality performance. Aggressive capital actions and a reduction in liquid banking assets could result in a downward movement in its standalone BCA.

ZB, N.A.

Ratings could be upgraded if Moody's views that Zions' risk management has been sufficiently enhanced and integrated within its strategic decision-making to sustain the improvements in its financial performance including limiting asset concentrations, balancing loan growth and underwriting standards, and avoiding earnings volatility. A downgrade of the BCA is possible if there is a rebuilding of asset concentrations, a significant decline in capital, or our opinion that there will be a meaningful reversal of improvements in asset quality.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published in June 2018. Please see the Rating Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

REGULATORY DISCLOSURES

For ratings issued on a program, series or category/class of debt, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to each rating of a subsequently issued bond or note of the same series or category/class of debt or pursuant to a program for which the ratings are derived exclusively from existing ratings in accordance with Moody's rating practices. For ratings issued on a support provider, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the credit rating action on the support provider and in relation to each particular credit rating action for securities that derive their credit ratings from the support provider's credit rating. For provisional ratings, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the provisional rating assigned, and in relation to a definitive rating that may be assigned subsequent to the final issuance of the debt, in each case where the transaction structure and terms have not changed prior to the assignment of the definitive rating in a manner that would have affected the rating. For further information please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page for the respective issuer on www.moodys.com.

For any affected securities or rated entities receiving direct credit support from the primary entity(ies) of this credit rating action, and whose ratings may change as a result of this credit rating action, the associated regulatory disclosures will be those of the guarantor entity. Exceptions to this approach exist for the following disclosures, if applicable to jurisdiction: Ancillary Services, Disclosure to rated entity, Disclosure from rated entity.

The ratings for United Bank, Banco Santander Puerto Rico, Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, MB Financial Bank, N.A., FirstBank Puerto Rico, First Midwest Bank, INTRUST Bank, N.A., City National Bank, TD Bank, N.A., CIBC Bank USA, and BMO Harris Bank National Association have been disclosed to the rated entities or its designated agent(s) and issued with no amendment resulting from that disclosure.

Regulatory disclosures contained in this press release apply to the credit rating and, if applicable, the related rating outlook or rating review.

The below contact information is provided for information purposes only. Please see the ratings tab of the issuer page at www.moodys.com, for each of the ratings covered, Moody's disclosures on the lead rating analyst and the Moody's legal entity that has issued the ratings.

The person who approved BMW Bank of North America, E*TRADE Bank, HSBC Bank USA, N.A., American Express National Bank, Sallie Mae Bank, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Delaware and CIT Bank, N.A., credit ratings is Ana Arsov, MD -- Financial Institutions, Financial Institutions Group, Journalists Tel: 212 553 0376, Client Service Tel: 212 553 1653. The person who approved Discover Bank, First National Bank of Omaha, PNC Bank, N.A., SunTrust Bank, Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, Amarillo National Bank, BOKF, NA, Citizens Bank, N.A., First Republic Bank, Comerica Bank, Frost Bank, Silicon Valley Bank, Webster Bank N.A., First Tennessee Bank, National Association, Hancock Whitney Bank, People's United Bank, N.A., Texas Capital Bank, National Association, Santander Bank, N.A., Compass Bank, First National Bank of Pennsylvania, BMO Harris Bank National Association, CIBC Bank USA, City National Bank, TD Bank, N.A., Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., Capital One, N.A., Northern Trust Company, Branch Banking and Trust Company, Commerce Bank, First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company, BankUnited, National Association, Synovus Bank, United Bank, Banco Santander Puerto Rico, Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, FirstBank Puerto Rico, MB Financial Bank, N.A, First MidWest Bank, INTRUST Bank, N.A., Associated Bank, N.A., Bank of Hawaii, Bank of the West, Fifth Third Bank, Ohio, KeyBank National Association, Fulton Bank, National Association, Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company, MUFG Union Bank, N.A., Old National Bank, Wilmington Trust, National Association, New York Community Bank, Regions Bank, TCF National Bank, U.S. Bank National Association, Huntington National Bank, First Hawaiian Bank, and ZB, N.A., credit ratings is M. Celina Vansetti Hutchins, MD - Banking, Financial Institutions Group, Journalists: 212 553 0376, Client Service Tel: 212 553 1653.

The relevant office for each credit rating is identified in "Debt/deal box" on the Ratings tab in the Debt/Deal List section of each issuer/entity page of the website.

Please see www.moodys.com for any updates on changes to the lead rating analyst and to the Moody's legal entity that has issued the rating.

Please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com for additional regulatory disclosures for each credit rating.

Megan Fox
AVP - Analyst
Financial Institutions Group
Moody's Investors Service, Inc.
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
U.S.A.
JOURNALISTS: 1 212 553 0376
Client Service: 1 212 553 1653

M. Celina Vansetti-Hutchins
MD - Banking
Financial Institutions Group
JOURNALISTS: 1 212 553 0376
Client Service: 1 212 553 1653

Releasing Office:
Moody's Investors Service, Inc.
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
U.S.A.
JOURNALISTS: 1 212 553 0376
Client Service: 1 212 553 1653

No Related Data.
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