Actions conclude review announcements from 15 February 2012
London, 30 May 2012 -- Moody's Investors Service has today downgraded the ratings for nine
Danish financial institutions and for one foreign subsidiary of a Danish
group by one to three notches. The short-term ratings declined
by one notch for six of these institutions.
The rating outlooks for five banks affected by today's rating actions
are stable, whereas the rating outlooks for two banks and for all
three specialised lenders affected by today's rating actions are
negative
Please click on this http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_142303
for the List of Affected Credit Ratings. This list is an integral
part of this Press Release and identifies each affected issuer.
The magnitude of some of today's downgrades reflects a range of
concerns, including the risk that some institutions' concentrated
loan books deteriorate amidst difficult domestic and European conditions,
with adverse consequences on their ability to refinance maturing debt.
The latter concern is exacerbated by structural changes in the terms of
Danish covered bonds and the mix of underlying assets that lead to increased
refinancing risk. While Moody's central scenario remains
that financial institutions show some resilience to what will likely be
a prolonged difficult environment - and the revised rating levels
for most Danish financial institutions continue to reflect low risks to
creditors - today's rating actions reflect the view that
these risks have increased.
Today's rating actions reflect two key sets of drivers:
1. A difficult operating environment, weakening asset quality
and low profitability. Danish financial institutions face sluggish
domestic economic growth, weakening real estate prices and higher
levels of unemployment, as well as the risk of external shocks from
the ongoing euro area debt crisis. Asset quality is deteriorating,
and these pressures are expected to continue, exacerbated by (i)
the junior-lien status of most mortgages in the loan books of Danish
banks, and (ii) for specialised lenders, their concentrated
exposure to certain sectors which leave them vulnerable to sector downturns.
Further, Danish financial institutions' weak profitability
limits their ability to absorb losses in this environment.
2. Substantial market-funding reliance of most financial
institutions increases vulnerability. Most market funds are in
the form of covered bonds which have historically been a stable funding
source. But structural changes to that market have increased refinancing
risk, posing a particular concern for mortgage credit institutions
whose access to alternative funding is limited.
Additional drivers specific to individual rated institutions are detailed
below.
Moody's recognises several mitigating factors that have limited
the extent of today's downgrades, but they do not fully offset
the above-mentioned concerns. These mitigating factors include
(i) the still-moderate level of problem loans at many institutions,
and their relatively good levels of capitalisation; (ii) sound government
finances (as reflected in Denmark's Aaa government bond rating,
with a stable outlook), (iii) the considerable (though not necessarily
liquid) wealth of Danish households; and (iv) the high level of social
security, which provides a level of support for borrowers and the
economy.
OUTLOOKS MOSTLY STABLE FOR BANKS, NEGATIVE FOR SPECIALISED LENDERS
The rating outlooks are stable for most banks affected by today's
actions. Stable rating outlooks reflect Moody's view that
currently-foreseen risks are incorporated in the revised rating
levels. The negative rating outlooks for two banks incorporate
issuer-specific factors. The negative outlooks for Danish
mortgage credit institutions and for Danmarks Skibskredit reflect their
near-exclusive reliance on covered bond funding, and for
mortgage institutions also increased refinancing risk as a result of growth
in covered bonds that fund adjustable-rate mortgages.
AVERAGE RATINGS FOR DANISH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS DECLINED TO Baa1
The average senior long-term ratings for Danish financial institutions
are now at Baa1, on an asset-weighted basis. This
average reflects the impact of the above-described downside risks
on standalone financial profiles and limited support-driven ratings
uplift. Moody's believes that Danish banks and credit institutions
are in a weaker position relative to their Nordic peers to manage the
credit risks emanating from the challenging domestic operating environment.
Moody's has published a Special Comment today titled "Key
Drivers of Rating Actions on Danish Financial Institutions,"
(http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_142284)
which provides more detail on the rationales for these rating actions.
For more information on bank ratings, please refer to the webpage
containing Moody's related announcements: http://www.moodys.com/bankratings2012.
OVERVIEW OF RATING ACTIONS
Today's changes to issuers' senior ratings can be summarized
as follows:
- BANKS
1. Danske Bank (deposit rating Baa1, standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) C- / baseline credit assessment (BCA) baa2)
was downgraded by two notches, and its short-term rating
downgraded to P-2 from P-1. Danske's Finnish
subsidiary Sampo Bank (deposits A2; BFSR C- / BCA baa1) was
downgraded by one notch.
2. Jyske Bank (deposits Baa1; BFSR C- / BCA baa2) was
downgraded by two notches, and its short-term rating downgraded
to P-2 from P-1.
3. Sydbank (deposits Baa1; BFSR C- / BCA baa2) was
downgraded by two notches, and its short-term rating downgraded
to P-2 from P-1.
4. Spar Nord Bank (deposits Baa3; BFSR D+ / BCA baa3)
was downgraded by one notch. The bank's short-term
rating was downgraded to P-3 from P-2.
5. Ringkjobing Landbobank (deposits Baa1; BFSR C- /
BCA baa1) was downgraded by one notch. The bank's P-2
short-term rating was affirmed.
- SPECIALISED CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
1. Nykredit Realkredit (issuer rating Baa2) was downgraded by three
notches. Its subsidiary Nykredit Bank (deposits Baa2; BFSR
D+ / BCA baa3) was downgraded by three notches. Short-term
ratings for both institutions were downgraded to P-2 from P-1.
2. DLR Kredit (issuer rating Ba1) was downgraded by three notches.
3. Danmarks Skibskredit (issuer rating Baa2) was downgraded by
three notches.
The Aaa ratings on government guaranteed debt issued by these institutions
are not affected by today's rating actions.
RATIONALE -- STANDALONE CREDIT STRENGTH
FIRST DRIVER -- DIFFICULT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, WEAKENING
ASSET QUALITY AND LOW PROFITABILITY
The operating environment in Denmark is characterized by weak economic
growth, weakening real estate prices and higher levels of unemployment.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects Denmark's gross domestic
product (GDP) growth for 2012 at a low 0.5%. Low
economic growth constrains credit demand, whilst prolonged stagnation
strains debtors' ability to repay their loans. Both trends
will likely affect loan performance. Unemployment has risen,
albeit from very low levels. Another factor weighing on the Danish
economy is the weakened real estate market.
In addition, Danish households are susceptible to adverse conditions
because of their high debt burden. Total financial liabilities
of households amounted to 142% of GDP at year-end 2010,
about twice as high as the 79% European Union average. Furthermore,
the large size of the Danish financial sector increases the risk of negative
feedback effects between a weakening economy and the health of financial
institutions.
Further shocks may also emanate from the ongoing euro area debt crisis.
While not a euro member, Denmark's small, open economy
and its financial markets are integrated into the EU, and neither
would be immune from further external shocks.
The above-described adverse conditions have already led to moderately
higher problem loans, contained in part by historically-low
interest rates which reduce debt service costs. Moody's expects
further asset quality deterioration, particularly if real estate
prices fall further and/or interest rates increase.
These asset quality concerns are exacerbated by Danish banks' providing
either second or sequential-lien loans, given the practice
of banks to transfer originated first-lien loans to mortgage credit
institutions. Moody's believes that in a stress scenario
this junior position leads to many Danish banks being at risk of higher
levels of losses than similar institutions in other markets.
Meanwhile, Danish mortgage and shipping credit institutions tend
to focus on specific sectors, for example commercial and household
mortgages, agriculture, or shipping. As such,
they are particularly exposed to a downturn in these sectors.
Finally, Danish financial institutions' low profitability
limits their ability to absorb losses. Low and even negative credit
growth, paired with the low interest environment, has negatively
affected banks' interest and fee income, even as institutions
have increased lending margins. Accordingly, pre-provision
earnings of Danish financial institutions are limited and have in 2011
been largely absorbed by provisioning costs. Danish banks have
improved capital, but low profitability means there is limited capacity
to absorb additional losses without eroding capital.
SECOND DRIVER -- MARKET FUNDING RELIANCE
Moody's views the reliance of many Danish financial institutions
on wholesale market funding as a weakness, because it leaves them
vulnerable to potential sudden changes in investor sentiment. Moody's
recognises the historical stability of the Danish covered bond market,
on which many domestic financial institutions rely, directly or
indirectly, for large parts of their funding. However,
Moody's is increasingly concerned by the dependence of Danish institutions
on the uninterrupted functioning of that market, particularly given
changes to its structure that increase refinancing risk.
The Danish covered bond market has shifted from long-term issuance
that matched mortgage duration, to covered bonds of shorter maturities
(funding adjustable-rate mortgages, ARMs, with annual
rate adjustments). The maturity mismatch between long-term
mortgages and the covered bonds funding them raises issuers' exposure
to refinancing risk very significantly. This is a credit negative,
as refinancing risk has materialised repeatedly in global funding markets
over the course of the financial crisis, even for ostensibly reliable
and resilient sectors.
Our ratings downgrades on specialised mortgage lenders are larger than
for Danish banks. Given their near-complete reliance on
covered bonds, specialised lenders would likely struggle to access
alternative funding sources in a funding stress scenario. Furthermore,
most Danish covered bonds require additional collateral to be provided
if the market value of existing collateral falls. However,
specialised issuers possess limited unpledged assets and may need recourse
to unsecured markets or to support from Danmarks Nationalbank in a stress
scenario.
In addition, we recognise that covered bonds play a central role
in Denmark, amounting to DKK2.4 trillion, or approximately135%
of GDP, at year-end 2011. They are widely issued by
financial institutions who also hold them as liquid assets. Any
issuer-specific problem would therefore likely spread and affect
other institutions.
For Danmarks Skibskredit, we recognise that their market funding,
via shipping bonds, continues to operate on a matched maturity basis
that reduces refinancing risk, assuming continued asset performance.
However, our rating downgrade reflects the risks associated with
the institution's concentrated asset portfolio, combined with
the reliance on this single market funding instrument.
SYSTEMIC SUPPORT UPLIFT REMAINS LIMITED
Moody's has not changed its support assumptions for Danish financial
institutions with respect to local or national governments. The
senior long-term ratings for several institutions continue to be
positioned one notch above their standalone credit assessments,
as Moody's expects them to benefit from a degree of government support,
if needed. Support-driven ratings uplift is, however,
limited compared with other European systems, given that the Danish
authorities have created a legislative and institutional structure which
allows them to impose losses on banks' senior creditors, and
have used this structure in the resolution of two small institutions.
Moody's recognises that large, more complex institutions are
inherently harder to resolve without disruption to markets, and
that the incentive for the government to provide support to bondholders
is commensurately greater. Nevertheless, the clear desire
of the Danish government to protect taxpayers by ensuring that bondholders
bear losses, clear statements of intent to that effect and the legislative
framework put in place argue for limiting systemic support uplift.
The subordinated debt and preferred stock ratings for seven of the affected
financial institutions have been downgraded today by the same number of
notches as their senior ratings. Subordinated debt at Danske Bank's
Finnish subsidiary, Sampo Bank, was downgraded by three notches,
following the removal of systemic support for these securities.
The removal of support for this debt class reflects Moody's view
that in Finland, systemic support for subordinated debt may no longer
be sufficiently predictable or reliable to be a sound basis for incorporating
uplift into Moody's ratings.
ACTIONS FOLLOW REVIEW ANNOUNCEMENTS ON 15 FEBRUARY 2012 AND PREVIOUSLY
Today's rating actions follow Moody's decision to review for downgrade
the ratings for 114 European financial institutions, including Danish
banks, see "Moody's reviews ratings for European Banks", 15
February 2012 (http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Reviews-Ratings-for-European-Banks--PR_237914).
The ratings of Danmarks Skibskredit had previously been placed on review
for downgrade, see press release "Moody's reviews Danmarks
Skibskredit's A2 ratings for downgrade, 25 November 2011 (http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-reviews-Danmarks-Skibskredits-A2-ratings-for-downgrade--PR_231802).
WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN
Rating upgrades are unlikely in the near future for banks affected by
today's actions, for the reasons cited above. A limited
amount of upward rating momentum could develop for some banks if a bank
substantially improves its credit profile and resilience to the prevailing
conditions. This may occur through increased standalone strength,
e.g. bolstered capital and liquidity buffers, work-out
of asset quality challenges or improved earnings. Improved credit
strength could also result from external support, e.g.
via a change in ownership or improved systemic support.
While the current rating levels and outlooks incorporate a degree of expected
further deterioration, ratings may decline further if (i) operating
conditions worsen beyond current expectations, notably if Denmark's
sovereign creditworthiness and economic environment encounter material
negative pressure, leading to asset quality deterioration exceeding
current expectations, and (ii) Danish banks' market funding
access, via covered bonds or wholesale markets, experiences
a sharp decline.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
For further detail please refer to:
- List of Affected Issuers (http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_142303),
30 May 2012
- Special Comment: Key Drivers of Danish Bank Rating Actions,
30 May 2012
- Press release "Moody's takes rating actions on five
Swedish banking groups; outlooks now stable", 24 May
2012
- Press release "Moody's downgrades DNB to A1/C-
from Aa3/C; outlook stable", 24 May 2012
- Special comment: Key Drivers of Swedish Bank Rating Actions,
24 May 2012
- Press Release: Moody's Reviews Ratings for European Banks,
15 Feb 2012
- Special Comment: Euro Area Debt Crisis Weakens Bank Credit
Profiles, 19 Jan 2012
- Special Comment: European Banks: How Moody's Analytic
Approach Reflects Evolving Challenges, 19 Jan 2012
Moody's webpages with additional information:
- http://www.moodys.com/bankratings2012
- http://www.moodys.com/eusovereign
BANK-SPECIFIC RATING CONSIDERATIONS
DANSKE BANK: The downgrade reflects continued pressure on Danske
Bank's asset quality, especially regarding its exposures to
Ireland, which we expect will continue to undermine the bank's
ability to build a solid base for earnings in the short to medium term.
In addition, amidst weak economic growth, deflating real estate
prices and increasing unemployment, we believe the operating environment
in Denmark remains difficult and expect it will be challenging for Danske
Bank to manage its domestic exposures. We also caution that low
interest-rate levels have thus far supported borrowers' ability
to repay their debts but loans with variable rates are vulnerable to interest-rate
hikes. Another key driver for the rating action is Danske Bank's
substantial reliance on market funding, which renders it susceptible
to changes in investor sentiment. Even though we recognise that
covered bonds have historically been a stable funding source, we
note the shift to shorter term instruments has increased refinancing risk.
SAMPO BANK: While we recognise the macro-economic environment
inFinland is more supportive than in many other European countries,
in our view the ongoing crisis in the Euro area will likely negatively
affect economic growth - and thereof Sampo Bank's earnings
opportunities in Finland. Furthermore, even though we positively
note that Sampo Bank has had good access to capital markets so far,
we view its high usage of market funds as a key credit risk, due
to the confidence sensitivity that such funding relies on.
The rating action also captures Moody's view that asset quality
will remain under pressure and that the bank's corporate exposures
may give rise to increased need for provisions. We also caution
that low interest-rate levels have thus far supported borrowers'
ability to repay their debts and that loans with variable rates are vulnerable
to interest-rate hikes.
JYSKE BANK: The downgrade reflects the difficult operating environment
for Danish banks, and specifically Jyske Bank's relatively
high exposure to agricultural and commercial real estate lending,
as well as the bank's reliance on second and sequential lien mortgages
in household and corporate lending. The latter factor is in line
with other Danish banks and results from the stronger funding position
of mortgage credit institutions that fund the first lien mortgage loans,
but compared to the bank's international peers we view this position
as credit negative, particularly in the current environment of weakening
asset quality. Moody's positively notes that Jyske Bank maintains
a strong position in the Danish market with an estimated market share
of approximately 10% for bank loans and with a good national presence,
Jyske Bank has also proved that it still has access to funding markets
and has a sizeable liquidity portfolio, substantially consisting
of other Danish institutions' covered bonds. Jyske Bank also
successfully completed a DKK1.2 billion share issue in Q1 2012.
The rating action also captures Moody's view that exposures to more
volatile sectors such as agriculture and commercial real estate may give
rise to increased need for provisions. We also caution that low
interest-rate levels have thus far supported borrowers' ability
to repay their debts but loans with variable rates are vulnerable to interest-rate
hikes.
SYDBANK: The downgrade reflects the difficult operating environment
for Danish banks, and more specifically Sydbank's relatively
high exposure to agricultural and commercial real estate lending,
as well as the bank's reliance on second and sequential lien mortgages
in household and corporate lending. The latter factor is in line
with other Danish banks and results from the stronger funding position
of mortgage credit institutions that fund the first lien mortgage loans.
However compared to the bank's international peers we view this
position as credit negative, particularly in the current environment
of weakening asset quality. Moody's positively notes that
Sydbank maintains a relatively strong position in the Danish market with
an estimated market share of approximately 6% for bank loans with
a good national presence. Sydbank's reported asset quality
is also better than domestic peers, with problem loans/ gross loans
at end 2011 of 4%, among the lowest of the rated Danish banks.
Sydbank has also proven access to funding markets, albeit at higher
interest rates, and has a sizeable liquidity portfolio, much
of it consisting of other Danish institutions' highly rated covered
bonds.
The rating action also captures Moody's view that exposures to more
volatile sectors such as agriculture and commercial real estate may give
rise to increased need for provisions. We also caution that low
interest-rate levels have thus far supported borrowers' ability
to repay their debts but loans with variable rates are vulnerable to interest-rate
hikes.
SPAR NORD BANK: The downgrade reflects the difficult operating environment
for Danish banks and Spar Nord's relatively high exposure to agricultural
and commercial real estate lending, combined with the challenges
the bank faces in refinancing its outstanding government guaranteed debt
maturing in 2012 and 2013 (DKK 3.7bn and DKK2.5bn respectively).
The bank also relies on second and sequential lien mortgages in household
and corporate lending, in line with other Danish banks, as
a result of the stronger funding position of mortgage credit institutions
that generally fund the first lien mortgage loans. However compared
to the bank's international peers we view this position as credit
negative, particularly in the current environment of weakening asset
quality .
The rating action also captures Moody's view that exposures to more
volatile sectors such as agriculture and commercial real estate may give
rise to increased need for provisions. We also caution that low
interest-rate levels have thus far supported borrowers' ability
to repay their debts but loans with variable rates are vulnerable to interest-rate
hikes.
RINGKJOBING LANDBOBANK: The downgrade reflects the difficult operating
environment for Danish banks, as well as the bank's relatively
limited regional franchise in the West of Jutland, which makes the
bank more vulnerable to region-specific developments. The
bank is characterised by relatively high exposure to agricultural lending,
which has led to elevated provisioning needs, and wind turbine financing.
Moreover, the bank relies on second and sequential lien mortgages
in household lending, whereas the corporate lending comprises a
mix of first and second lien financing. In particular the wind
turbines financing benefits from first lien mortgages. This results
from the stronger funding position of mortgage credit institutions that
generally fund Danish households' and corporates' first lien
mortgage loans, but compared to the bank's international peers
we view this position as credit negative, particularly in the current
environment of weakening asset quality.
The rating action captures Moody's view that exposures to more volatile
sectors may give rise to increased need for provisions. We also
caution that low interest-rate levels have thus far supported borrowers'
ability to repay their debts but loans with variable rates are vulnerable
to interest-rate hikes. The one-notch downgrade of
the standalone credit assessment for Ringkjobing Landbobank to baa1 means
we view the bank as the strongest rated Danish financial institution on
a standalone basis. This assessment reflects Ringkjobing's
solid recent performance with high levels of profitability and capital.
NYKDREDIT REALKREDIT: The downgrade reflects our view that the challenges
Nykredit Realkredit faces have increased, notably regarding the
operating environment in Denmark, exposures to more volatile sectors,
and wholesale funding reliance. The Danish operating environment
continues to be characterised by weak economic growth, deflating
real estate prices, and increased unemployment. Nykredit
Realkredit has relatively high exposure to more vulnerable sectors such
as agriculture and commercial real estate. We caution that low
interest-rate levels have thus far supported borrowers' ability
to repay their debts but loans with variable rates are vulnerable to interest-rate
hikes. With regards to Nykredit Realkredit's reliance on
covered bond funding, we have recognised the historically strong
structural features of the Danish covered bond system. However,
we are increasingly concerned by the dependence of Danish institutions
on the uninterrupted functioning of that market, particularly given
changes to its structure that increase refinancing risk.
NYKREDIT BANK: The downgrade of Nykredit Bank's BFSR reflects
our view that the challenges the bank faces have increased, notably
regarding the operating environment and asset quality concerns.
The downgrade of Nykredit Bank's senior debt to Baa2 reflects the
downgrade of its parent Nykredit Realkredit (issuer rating to Baa2 from
A2).The bank is characterised by relatively high exposures to commercial
real estate, which has led to elevated provisioning needs.
Moreover, in line with other Danish banks, the bank relies
on second and sequential lien mortgages in household and corporate lending.
This results from the stronger funding position of mortgage credit institutions,
including its parent Nykredit Realkredit, that generally fund Danish
households' and corporates' first lien mortgage loans.
Compared to the bank's international peers we view this position
as credit negative, particularly in the current environment of weakening
asset quality. Moody's positively recognises Nykredit Bank's
franchise strength as part of the Nykredit Realkredit Group: at
year-end 2011 Moody's estimated the bank's loan and
deposit market share at 5%. The bank maintains healthy capital
ratios and benefits from Group support, though we deem the group's
ability to generate additional capital in case of need as more limited.
The rating action also captures Moody's view that exposures to more
volatile sectors such as agriculture and commercial real estate may give
rise to increased need for provisions. We caution that low interest-rate
levels have thus far supported borrowers' ability to repay their
debts but loans with variable rates are vulnerable to interest-rate
hikes.
DLR KREDIT: The downgrade reflects DLR Kredit's sole reliance
on one funding instrument, covered bond funding. We consider
concentrated reliance on one form of funding as a weakness, as it
reduces the funding flexibility under stress. Although we recognise
the strong historic features of the Danish covered bond system,
we note the shift to shorter term instruments has increased refinancing
risk. We regard continued funding access as a key aspect of the
creditworthiness of any financial institution, and consequently
generally regard a concentrated funding profile as a credit weakness.
In the event of any name-specific or system-specific investor
concerns with respect to covered bonds, we view Danish mortgage
institutions' access to alternative market funding as extremely
limited.
The rating action also captures the difficult operating environment for
Danish financial institutions, as well as Moody's view that
DLR Kredit's focus on more volatile sectors such as agriculture
and commercial real estate may give rise to increased need for provisions.
We caution that low interest-rate levels have thus far supported
borrowers' ability to repay their debts but loans with variable
rates are vulnerable to interest-rate hikes. The rating
decision also takes into account that the creditworthiness of DLR Kredit's
shareholding banks, that provide asset quality guarantees,
has declined in recent years.
DANMARKS SKIBSKREDIT: The downgrade reflects our view that the challenges
DSF faces have increased, notably regarding (i) the continued vulnerable
operating environment for shipping, on which DSF's lending
is fully focused, (ii) high borrower concentration, and (iii)
reliance on wholesale funding. As for other Danish specialised
lenders, we view DSF's reliance on wholesale market funding
as a weakness, because it renders the institution vulnerable to
potential sudden market movements and changes in investor sentiment.
We recognise that DSF's market funding, via shipping bonds,
continues to operate on a matched maturity basis that reduces refinancing
risk, assuming continued asset performance. However,
the turmoil in shipping markets and the institutions' highly concentrated
asset portfolio have increased the risk of DSF's market funding
reliance.
Mitigating factors that have limited the extent of the downgrade include
(i) DSF's well established franchise, (ii) its good capital
position and liquidity cushion, and (iii) its proven track record
in maintaining asset quality over a volatile period in shipping.
The principle methodologies used in these ratings were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology, published in February
2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's
Bank Ratings: Global Methodology, published in March 2012.
Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for
a copy of these methodologies
REGULATORY DISCLOSURES
For ratings issued on a program, series or category/class of debt,
this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation
to each rating of a subsequently issued bond or note of the same series
or category/class of debt or pursuant to a program for which the ratings
are derived exclusively from existing ratings in accordance with Moody's
rating practices. For ratings issued on a support provider,
this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation
to the rating action on the support provider and in relation to each particular
rating action for securities that derive their credit ratings from the
support provider's credit rating. For provisional ratings,
this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation
to the provisional rating assigned, and in relation to a definitive
rating that may be assigned subsequent to the final issuance of the debt,
in each case where the transaction structure and terms have not changed
prior to the assignment of the definitive rating in a manner that would
have affected the rating. For further information please see the
ratings tab on the issuer/entity page for the respective issuer on www.moodys.com.
The ratings have been disclosed to the rated entities or their designated
agents and issued with no amendment resulting from that disclosure.
Information sources used to prepare the ratings are the following :
parties involved in the ratings, parties not involved in the ratings,
public information, and confidential and proprietary Moody's
Investors Service information.
Moody's adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning the ratings is of sufficient quality and from sources
Moody's considers to be reliable including, when appropriate,
independent third-party sources. However, Moody's
is not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify or
validate information received in the rating process.
Moody's considers the quality of information available on the rated
entities, obligations or credits satisfactory for the purposes of
issuing these ratings.
Moody's Investors Service may have provided Ancillary or Other Permissible
Service(s) to the rated entities or their related third parties within
the two years preceding the credit rating action. Please see the
special report "Ancillary or other permissible services provided
to entities rated by MIS's EU credit rating agencies" on the
ratings disclosure page on our website www.moodys.com for
further information.
Please see the ratings disclosure page on www.moodys.com
for general disclosure on potential conflicts of interests.
Please see the ratings disclosure page on www.moodys.com
for information on (A) MCO's major shareholders (above 5%) and
for (B) further information regarding certain affiliations that may exist
between directors of MCO and rated entities as well as (C) the names of
entities that hold ratings from MIS that have also publicly reported to
the SEC an ownership interest in MCO of more than 5%. A
member of the board of directors of this rated entity may also be a member
of the board of directors of a shareholder of Moody's Corporation;
however, Moody's has not independently verified this matter.
Please see Moody's Rating Symbols and Definitions on the Rating Process
page on www.moodys.com for further information on the meaning
of each rating category and the definition of default and recovery.
Please see ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com
for the last rating action and the rating history.
The date on which some ratings were first released goes back to a time
before Moody's ratings were fully digitized and accurate data may not
be available. Consequently, Moody's provides a date that
it believes is the most reliable and accurate based on the information
that is available to it. Please see the ratings disclosure page
on our website www.moodys.com for further information.
Please see www.moodys.com for any updates on changes to
the lead rating analyst and to the Moody's legal entity that has issued
the rating.
Simon Harris
MD - Financial Institutions
Financial Institutions Group
Moody's Investors Service Ltd.
One Canada Square
Canary Wharf
London E14 5FA
United Kingdom
JOURNALISTS: 44 20 7772 5456
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Gregory?Winans?Bauer
MD - Global Banking
Financial Institutions Group
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
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Moody's downgrades Danish financial institutions, outlooks stable for most banks, negative for specialist lenders
