Actions conclude rating reviews announced on 15 February 2012
Frankfurt am Main, June 15, 2012 -- Moody's Investors Service has today downgraded the long-term debt
and deposit ratings for five Dutch banking groups.
The long-term debt and deposit ratings for four groups declined
by two notches: to Aa2 for Rabobank Nederland, to A2 for ING
Bank N.V., to A2 for ABN AMRO Bank N.V.,
and to Baa2 for LeasePlan Corporation N.V.. The long-term
debt and deposit ratings for SNS Bank N.V. were downgraded
by one notch to Baa2. The short-term ratings for all aforementioned
groups are unchanged.
Concurrently, Moody's has assigned stable outlooks to the
ratings for four of the aforementioned groups, while assigning negative
outlooks to the ratings for ING Bank N.V. and its related
entities.
Please click this link http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_143130
for the List of Affected Credit Ratings. This list is an integral
part of this Press Release and identifies each affected issuer.
For additional information on bank ratings, please refer to the
webpage containing Moody's related announcements http://www.moodys.com/bankratings2012.
Today's actions reflect Moody's view that Dutch banks will
face difficult operating conditions throughout 2012 and possibly beyond.
Furthermore, the Dutch banks affected by today's actions have
structural features which, while not new, heighten risks for
creditors amidst elevated uncertainty and downside risks to the economic
outlook and fragile investor confidence in Europe. With today's
rating actions, Moody's is giving greater weight to these
features in assessing the overall risk profile of these institutions,
consistent with its previously-announced analytic approach (see
"European Banks -- How Moody's Analytic Approach Reflects
Evolving Challenges", 19 January 2012, http://www.moodys.com/research/European-Banks-How-Moodys-Analytic-Approach-Reflects-Evolving-Challenges--PBC_139207).
Specifically, the main drivers underlying today's rating actions
on Dutch banks are as follows:
(i) Adverse operating conditions, including the current recession
and declining house prices in the Netherlands, will likely persist
at least through 2012. Moreover, the Netherlands, as
a euro area member deeply integrated within the EU, is affected
by the ongoing euro area debt crisis and regional economic weakness.
Economic weakness limits household incomes and business earnings,
which will likely adversely affect credit costs and profitability for
banks.
(ii) The Dutch banks affected by today's rating actions have characteristics
that render them more vulnerable in the current environment, including
structural reliance on wholesale funds and large mortgage books.
Wholesale funding is susceptible to changes in investor confidence,
while high real estate exposures leave banks sensitive to potential deterioration
in loan performance given declining real estate collateral values.
Moody's recognises, however, that Dutch banks have generally
retained good access to market funding, and asset quality remains
sound to date.
In addition, Moody's assumptions about the availability of
government support for ABN AMRO have declined slightly, reducing
the support-driven uplift factored into the long-term debt
and deposit ratings for the bank to three notches (previously four).
Support-driven ratings uplift for ABN AMRO is now more in line
with other systemically-important European banks. Support-driven
ratings uplift for the other four Dutch groups downgraded today is unchanged.
More detail on bank-specific rating drivers is discussed below.
The revised rating levels also take into account several mitigating factors,
including (i) the large Dutch banks' strong, sustainable domestic
franchises; (ii) improved regulatory capitalisation; and (iii)
relatively stable pre-provision earnings. Moody's
also recognises that the domestic environment for Dutch banks has weakened
less compared with more stressed euro area countries, given the
strong credit profile of the Dutch government (rated Aaa, with a
stable outlook).
Following today's downgrades, the average asset-weighted
deposit rating for Dutch banks is between A1 and A2 (closer to A1),
but still ranks in the upper range among European banking systems.
The average asset-weighted standalone credit assessments is between
a3 and baa1 (closer to baa1), also in the upper peer range.
Moody's has published a Special Comment today entitled "Key Drivers of
Dutch Bank Rating Actions," (http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_143143)
which provides more detail on the rationales for these rating actions.
MOST RATING OUTLOOKS ARE STABLE
The stable rating outlooks for four of the five Dutch banking groups downgraded
today express Moody's view that currently foreseen risks to creditors
are now reflected in these ratings. Nevertheless, negative
rating momentum could develop if conditions deteriorate beyond current
expectations. Specifically, Moody's has factored into
the ratings an increased risk of an exit of Greece from the euro area,
but this is currently not the central scenario. If a Greek exit
became Moody's central scenario, further rating actions on
European banks could well be needed.
The negative rating outlooks for ING Bank and its related entities take
into account the bank's specific funding structure, which
substantially relies on wholesale funds and which has a significant proportion
of non-domestic deposits. Under a stressed scenario,
some of these non-domestic deposits could, in Moody's
view, become less fungible as national regulators focus on safeguarding
local liquidity.
RATINGS RATIONALE -- STANDALONE CREDIT STRENGTH
- FIRST DRIVER: ADVERSE OPERATING CONDITIONS WILL LIKELY
PERSIST
The Dutch economy is currently in recession and Moody's expects
Dutch real GDP to contract by 0.6% in 2012 overall (see
Sovereign Country Credit Statistical Handbook, 31 May 2012,
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_141528).
As an open economy deeply integrated within the EU, the Netherlands
is affected by regional economic weakness and by the increased risk of
additional shocks emanating from the ongoing euro area debt crisis.
In addition, housing prices in the Netherlands have declined since
2009 after more than a decade of steady growth (source: Dutch Central
Bank). As a result, the value of real estate collateral backing
domestic housing loans is declining. Amidst the current recession,
bankruptcies have also risen to the highest level since 1993 (source:
Central statistical office of the Netherlands), posing a risk for
banks' lending to small and mid-sized enterprises.
Furthermore, Dutch households have some of the highest debt levels
among western European countries, at 127% of GDP and almost
250% of gross income at year-end 2010 (source: Eurostat).
Moody's recognises that Dutch household loans, including banks'
large residential mortgage books, have shown resilient performance
to date; however, highly indebted Dutch consumers are vulnerable
to the possibility of a prolonged recession.
- SECOND DRIVER: BANKS HAVE STRUCTURAL FEATURES THAT LEAVE
THEM VULNERABLE TO PREVAILING ELEVATED RISKS AND UNCERTAINTY
As stated, the Dutch banks affected by today's actions have
structural features that, while not new, exacerbate risks
for bank creditors in the current difficult environment. Specifically,
the large mortgage books of Dutch banks have historically contributed
to low and relatively stable loan losses; however, amidst the
current recession and declining housing values, this large sector
exposure may lead to elevated losses if the so-far modest deterioration
of housing loans accelerates. Besides their large household mortgage
portfolios, several Dutch banks are also active in commercial real
estate (CRE) lending. Collateral values for these loans have declined
in recent years together with commercial property prices (source:
DNB/International Monetary Fund).
Another key vulnerability of Dutch banks is their structural reliance
on wholesale and non-domestic funding sources to finance a portion
of their core domestic lending. This reliance renders banks vulnerable
to potentially sudden changes in market confidence amidst the adverse
and highly uncertain European operating environment. Indicating
a gap in retail funding, the loan-to-deposit ratio
of ING Bank, Rabobank, ABN AMRO and SNS Bank ranged between
122% and 162% at year-end 2011 (source: Moody's
computation based on company reports), above the levels of many
international peers. In addition, under a stressed scenario,
non-domestic deposits of Dutch banks could, in Moody's
view, become less fungible, because national regulators increasingly
focus on safeguarding local liquidity.
These concerns are partly mitigated by the success of Dutch banks in accessing
capital markets on reasonable terms recently, and by their ability
to maintain or increase average debt maturities and grow deposits.
- MITIGATING FACTORS: SOLID DOMESTIC FRANCHISES AND IMPROVED
REGULATORY CAPITALISATION SUPPORT STANDALONE CREDIT PROFILES
Dutch banks' strong and sustainable domestic franchises are a source
of steady pre-provision earnings. These earnings provide
a buffer to absorb losses and underpin the continued high ratings for
the leading Dutch banks relative to many of their European peers.
Dutch banks also recorded solid net profits in 2010 and 2011, bolstered
by low loan-loss provisions, although credit costs may increase
going forward.
Another mitigating factor is the improved regulatory capitalisation of
most banks, which have increased significantly in recent years.
However, Moody's notes that banks face only small capital
charges against their large residential mortgage books, which carry
low regulatory risk weights. If the historically strong performance
of these loans deteriorated significantly, banks would have only
limited equity cushions and reserves to absorb any losses exceeding their
earnings.
RATINGS RATIONALE -- LONG AND SHORT-TERM DEBT AND
DEPOSIT RATINGS
The long-term debt and deposit ratings for four of the five Dutch
banking groups downgraded today continue to be positioned above their
standalone credit assessments, reflecting Moody's assumption
of a high likelihood of systemic support, if needed.
The debt and deposit ratings of ABN AMRO now benefit from three notches
of government support-driven ratings uplift (vs. four notches
previously). The revised ratings uplift is more in line with other
European banks and reflects the clear intent of the Dutch government to
sell its ownership stake.
The debt and deposit ratings for Rabobank, ING Bank and SNS Bank
continue to benefit from two notches of support uplift. The debt
and deposit ratings for LeasePlan do not incorporate any uplift,
as its smaller size and international business model make it less systemically
important.
RATINGS RATIONALE -- SUBORDINATED DEBT AND HYBRID RATINGS
In addition to the above-described rating actions, Moody's
has today downgraded the subordinated debt ratings of four Dutch banking
groups by up to five notches, following the removal of systemic
support for these securities and the respective reductions of the banks'
standalone credit assessments. The removal of support for this
debt class reflects Moody's view that, in the Netherlands,
systemic support for subordinated debt is no longer sufficiently predictable
and reliable to warrant incorporating uplift into Moody's ratings.
(For more detail, see 29 November 2011 announcement "Moody's reviews
European banks' subordinated, junior and Tier 3 debt for downgrade"
- http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-reviews-European-banks-subordinated-junior-and-Tier-3-debt--PR_231957.)
Furthermore, Moody's downgraded today the junior subordinated debt
ratings of Rabobank by two notches to Baa1(hyb), reflecting the
securities' junior ranking compared with subordinated debt and the lowering
of the bank's standalone credit assessment.
WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN
The current rating levels and outlooks incorporate a degree of expected
further deterioration. However, the ratings may decline further
(i) if operating conditions worsen beyond current expectations,
notably if the economic environment encountered material negative pressure,
leading to asset-quality deterioration exceeding current expectations;
or (ii) if Dutch banks' market funding access experiences a significant
decline; or (iii) if earnings or asset quality deteriorate sharply.
Rating upgrades are unlikely in the near future for banks affected by
today's actions, for the reasons cited above. A limited amount
of upward rating momentum could develop for some banks if the relevant
bank substantially improves its credit profile and resilience to the prevailing
conditions. This may occur through increased standalone strength,
e.g. bolstered capital and liquidity buffers, work-out
of asset-quality challenges or improved earnings. Improved
credit strength could also result from external support, such as
a change in ownership or an improved likelihood of systemic support.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
For further detail please refer to:
- List of Affected Issuers (http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_143130),
15 June 2012
- Special Comment: Key Drivers of Dutch Bank Rating Actions,
15 June 2012
- Press Release: Moody's Reviews Ratings for European Banks,
15 Feb 2012
- Special Comment: How Sovereign Credit Quality May Affect
Other Ratings, 13 Feb 2012.
- Special Comment: Euro Area Debt Crisis Weakens Bank Credit
Profiles, 19 Jan 2012
- Special Comment: European Banks: How Moody's Analytic
Approach Reflects Evolving Challenges, 19 Jan 2012
Moody's webpages with additional information:
- http://www.moodys.com/bankratings2012
- http://www.moodys.com/eusovereign
The methodologies used in these ratings were Bank Financial Strength Ratings:
Global Methodology published in February 2007, and Incorporation
of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank Ratings: Global
Methodology, published in March 2012. Please see the Credit
Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of these methodologies.
BANK-SPECIFIC RATING CONSIDERATIONS
Please click this link http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_143130
for the List of Affected Credit Ratings. This list is an integral
part of this Press Release and identifies each affected issuer.
RABOBANK NEDERLAND (Aa2 STABLE/P-1, B-/a1 STABLE)
At Aa2, Rabobank remains one of the most highly rated banks in Europe.
The two-notch downgrade of its ratings reflects our view that,
despite the many strengths and mitigants highlighted below, a long-term
rating higher than Aa2 is not commensurate with an institution using wholesale
funding and operating in the current adverse European economic environment.
We anticipate that Rabobank will experience pressures on profitability
and asset quality arising from the unfavourable operating environment
both in the Netherlands and the euro area. Pressure on deposit
margins in the Netherlands and an environment of elevated wholesale funding
cost could affect Rabobank's earnings in our view. Credit
losses are likely to increase as a result of the worsening of the macro-economic
environment in the Netherlands thereby adding to profitability pressures.
At the same time, we consider Rabobank's track record of satisfactory
risk management and resilient earnings generation during the crisis to
date, the latter being a reflection of its exceptional franchise
in its domestic market. Further, the lengthening of the duration
of its liabilities has reduced the bank's exposure to confidence
sensitivity and its high level of capital provides it with comfortable
loss-absorption capacity.
.
ING BANK N.V. (A2 NEGATIVE/P-1, C-/baa1,
NEGATIVE)
The two-notch downgrade of ING Bank's standalone credit assessment
primarily reflects our reassessment of its funding structure, as
well as potential pressures on asset quality and profitability resulting
from the weakening macroeconomic environment. Although ING is a
major deposit-taker through its ING Direct business, it nonetheless
has a significant reliance on wholesale funding which is not wholly available
to finance the gap as reflected by the high loan-to-deposit
ratio in the domestic banking business of its parent, ING Bank.
We consider this reliance to be mitigated in part by its low asset encumbrance,
as well as the bank's on-going efforts to lengthen the duration
of its debt and redeploy the excess funding from its subsidiaries through
an active group-wide balance sheet management strategy.
These efforts, however, may yet face some time and regulatory
hurdles. Moody's also notes that a large share of the bank's
overall deposits is internet-based and may prove less sticky.
Among the general factors mitigating the downgrade, we recognise
that ING Bank's franchise remains strong and generates sustainable
earnings and sufficient capital generation to maintain its 10%
minimum core Tier-1 target ratio after the repayment of the residual
state aid within a reasonable timeframe. The two-notch downgrade
of ING bank's debt and deposit ratings to A2 reflects the lowering
of the bank's standalone credit strength. Moody's continues to
incorporate two notches of uplift into the debt and deposit ratings to
reflect potential systemic support. The negative outlook on both
ING Bank's BFSR and senior debt and deposit ratings reflects Moody's
view that further deterioration in the funding environment for European
banks' may weigh on its liquidity due to its aforementioned specific
funding structure.
ING GROEP N.V. (A3 NEGATIVE)
The two-notch downgrade of ING Groep's long-term senior
debt was prompted by the downgrade of ING Bank's long-term
senior ratings. The negative outlooks are aligned. ING Groep
is the main holding company of the group and parent company of ING Verzekeringen
N.V. (Baa2 debt rating) and ING Bank. Going forward,
and following management's announcement that it intends to divest
the entire insurance operation by the end of 2013, ING Groep will
become a pure bank with its ownership limited to ING's banking activities.
Therefore, ING Groep's senior and subordinated ratings reflect Moody's
standard notching for bank holding companies relative to ING Bank's ratings.
ING BELGIUM SA/NV (A2 NEGATIVE/P-1, C-/baa1,
NEGATIVE)
The lowering of ING Belgium's standalone credit assessment to baa1
reflects the strong interdependence of the bank with its parent company
due to certain unsecured intra-group exposures. We understand
these exposures will be subject to new regulatory limitations capping
them at the level of the subsidiary's equity by the end of 2012.
Given this concentration risk, we believe there is a convergence
between the profile of ING Belgium and that of the group and the subsidiary's
standalone credit strength remains aligned with the one of ING Bank.
Supporting factors for ING Belgium's standalone credit strength
include its solid financial profile as one of the leading commercial banks
in Belgium with deeply entrenched franchises. ING Belgium's
A2 long-term senior ratings continue to incorporate two notches
of systemic uplift from its baa1 standalone credit assessment, reflecting
the bank's strong market position in Belgium. The negative outlook
on its ratings reflects the negative outlook on all of ING Bank's
ratings in the context of the above-mentioned interdependence.
ING DiBa AG (A2 NEGATIVE/P-1, C/a3, NEGATIVE)
The one-notch lowering of ING DiBa AG's standalone credit
assessment to a3 mostly reflects the current degree of its strategic and
operational interdependence with its parent, ING Bank. Whilst
Moody's recognises a satisfactory level of ring fencing from risks
elsewhere in the ING group, the correlation in the areas of reputation
and investor confidence gave reason to position the standalone rating
at a level no higher than two notches above that of ING DiBa's parent,
as did also the bank's asset profile adjustments in response to
the group's funding needs outside Germany. Supporting factors
for the a3 standalone credit assessment, which remains at the high
end of the German banks' standalone rating universe, include
ING DiBa's robust credit and funding profiles in combination with
its high loss-absorption capacity from earnings and capital,
as reflected in Moody's capital stress tests. The two-notch
downgrade of its long-term debt ratings to A2 follows the lowering
of its standalone credit strength. The downgrade additionally reflects
the weakened support capacity of its parent, ING Bank, at
its lower standalone credit assessment of baa1, even though Moody's
has not changed its assumptions of ING Bank having a high readiness to
support its group members. Also, a high probability of systemic
support continues to be factored into the A2 ratings. The outlook
on ING DiBa's ratings is negative, reflecting the negative
outlook on all of ING Bank's ratings in the context of the above-mentioned
interdependence.
ABN AMRO BANK N.V. (A2 STABLE/P-1, C-/baa2
STABLE)
As a primarily domestically focused commercial bank, the one-notch
lowering of ABN AMRO's standalone credit assessment reflects our
expectation that the deteriorating operating environment in the Netherlands
will pose challenges to the bank's profitability and asset quality
in the coming quarters. Given the moderate reliance on wholesale
funding, the bank is likely to be faced with higher funding cost,
affecting earnings. However, the bank has made substantial
progress towards reaching the full operational integration of the two
former banks, ABN AMRO and Fortis Bank Nederland N.V.
(which were merged in July 2010) and has implemented further cost control
initiatives that should counter some of these pressures. We also
consider the bank's strong capital base relative to its peers and
its sound liquidity to be counterbalancing factors. The two-notch
downgrade of ABN AMRO's long-term ratings follows the lower
standalone credit assessment and also reflects Moody's re-assessment
of the willingness of the Dutch government to provide systemic support
to the group, in case of need. The uplift for systemic support
included in the long-term debt and deposit ratings of ABN AMRO
was lowered to three from four notches and brought into line with the
same support probabilities applicable to other large and systemically
important Dutch and European banks and reflects the clear intent of the
Dutch government to sell its ownership stake .
SNS BANK N.V. (Baa2 STABLE/P-2, D+/ba1
STABLE)
The one-notch lowering of SNS Bank's standalone credit assessment
to ba1 reflects our concerns that the bank's large Dutch and international
property finance portfolio - which is currently in wind-down
mode - makes it vulnerable to pressures in our capital stress test
simulations in a highly adverse scenario. Despite a significant
reduction in SNS Bank's exposures to real estate development projects
in recent years, the more challenging macroeconomic environment
in the euro area lead us to expect further impairments in the bank's
portfolio until its wind-down has been completed. SNS Bank
is also exposed to a deterioration of the Dutch housing market through
its large mortgage book. We also took into account a number of
counterbalancing factors, including the opportunity available to
SNS Bank to transfer part of the potential losses on mortgages to investors
under the sold first loss pieces on its own Dutch RMBS transactions.
Further, we consider the bank's liquidity profile to have
strengthened due to a significant increase in its deposit funding,
an ample liquidity buffer as well as decreasing funding requirements on
its property finance portfolio. The downgrade of SNS bank's
long-term rating to Baa2 reflects the lowering of the bank's standalone
credit strength and Moody's unchanged assessment of high systemic support.
The Prime-2 short-term rating was confirmed.
LEASEPLAN CORPORATION N.V. (Baa2 STABLE/P-2,
C-/baa2 STABLE)
The two-notch lowering of LeasePlan's standalone credit assessment
reflects the bank's high reliance on wholesale funding despite its growing
internet deposit base. We consider internet sourced deposits to
be relatively price and confidence sensitive as compared to more traditional
network sourced deposits. Residual value risk -- inherent
to the car leasing business - is another key risk driver for LeasePlan's
ratings. In a weakening environment LeasePlan will be exposed to
sluggish second-hand car markets and deteriorating corporate credit
quality, which we have taken into account in our capital stress
tests. At the same time, we considered LeasePlan's
proven ability to pass on higher funding costs to its corporate customers
without a visible impact on its commercial franchise, thereby buffering
its profitability and in turn therefore loss-absorption capacity.
Furthermore, the strong diversification of its lease portfolio,
both by geographies and by customers, should support LeasePlan's
asset quality. The downgrade of LeasePlan's long-term debt
and deposit ratings by two notches to Baa2 follows the lowering of its
standalone credit strength. We maintain the view that LeasePlan
is unlikely to benefit from systemic nor parental support from its majority
owner Volkswagen Financial Services AG (A3 positive).
REGULATORY DISCLOSURES
Please click on this link http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_143130
for the List of Affected Credit Ratings. This list is an integral
part of this Press Release and provides, for each of the credit
ratings covered, Moody's disclosures on the following items:
Endorsement
Releasing Office
Person Approving Credit Rating
For ratings issued on a program, series or category/class of debt,
this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation
to each rating of a subsequently issued bond or note of the same series
or category/class of debt or pursuant to a program for which the ratings
are derived exclusively from existing ratings in accordance with Moody's
rating practices. For ratings issued on a support provider,
this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation
to the rating action on the support provider and in relation to each particular
rating action for securities that derive their credit ratings from the
support provider's credit rating. For provisional ratings,
this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation
to the provisional rating assigned, and in relation to a definitive
rating that may be assigned subsequent to the final issuance of the debt,
in each case where the transaction structure and terms have not changed
prior to the assignment of the definitive rating in a manner that would
have affected the rating. For further information please see the
ratings tab on the issuer/entity page for the respective issuer on www.moodys.com.
The ratings have been disclosed to the rated entities or their designated
agents and issued with no amendment resulting from that disclosure
Information sources used to prepare the ratings are the following :
parties involved in the ratings, public information, and confidential
and proprietary Moody's Investors Service information.
Moody's adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning the ratings is of sufficient quality and from sources
Moody's considers to be reliable including, when appropriate,
independent third-party sources. owever, Moody's
is not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify or
validate information received in the rating process.
Moody's considers the quality of information available on the rated
entities, obligations or credits satisfactory for the purposes of
issuing these ratings.
Moody's Investors Service may have provided Ancillary or Other Permissible
Service(s) to the rated entities or their related third parties within
the two years preceding the credit rating action. Please see the
special report "Ancillary or other permissible services provided
to entities rated by MIS's EU credit rating agencies" on the
ratings disclosure page on our website www.moodys.com for
further information.
The below contact information is provided for information purposes only.
Please see the issuer page on www.moodys.com for Moody's
regulatory disclosure of the name of the lead analyst and the office that
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The relevant Releasing Office for each rating is identified under the
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on moodys.com
Please see the ratings disclosure page on www.moodys.com
for general disclosure on potential conflicts of interests.
Please see the ratings disclosure page on www.moodys.com
for information on (A) MCO's major shareholders (above 5%) and
for (B) further information regarding certain affiliations that may exist
between directors of MCO and rated entities as well as (C) the names of
entities that hold ratings from MIS that have also publicly reported to
the SEC an ownership interest in MCO of more than 5%. A
member of the board of directors of this rated entity may also be a member
of the board of directors of a shareholder of Moody's Corporation;
however, Moody's has not independently verified this matter.
Please see Moody's Rating Symbols and Definitions on the Rating Process
page on www.moodys.com for further information on the meaning
of each rating category and the definition of default and recovery.
Please see ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com
for the last rating action and the rating history.
The date on which some ratings were first released goes back to a time
before Moody's ratings were fully digitized and accurate data may not
be available. Consequently, Moody's provides a date that
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on our website www.moodys.com for further information.
Please see www.moodys.com for any updates on changes to
the lead rating analyst and to the Moody's legal entity that has issued
the rating.
Carola?Schuler
MD - Banking
Financial Institutions Group
Moody's Deutschland GmbH
An der Welle 5
Frankfurt am Main 60322
Germany
JOURNALISTS: 44 20 7772 5456
SUBSCRIBERS: 44 20 7772 5454
Gregory?Winans?Bauer
MD - Global Banking
Financial Institutions Group
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653
Releasing Office:
Moody's Deutschland GmbH
An der Welle 5
Frankfurt am Main 60322
Germany
JOURNALISTS: 44 20 7772 5456
SUBSCRIBERS: 44 20 7772 5454
Moody's downgrades Dutch banking groups; most outlooks now stable
